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EvidenceCorner | Prior Statements

Prior statements in Montana: Part I
Introduction and prior inconsistent statements
By Cynthia Ford
Wendy, the witness, testifies in court, recounting the
assault. She claims that she was raped against her will; Dan, the
defendant, insists that the intercourse was consensual. (This
might sound a little familiar?) As the prosecutor, wouldn’t you
want to augment Wendy’s in-court statement with all the other
statements she made before trial, in which she said exactly the
same thing to other people? If she said the same thing before to
different people on different occasions, don’t we think it’s more
likely that she is now telling the truth? And if you are the defense
lawyer, shouldn’t the jury know that Wendy described the event
differently to someone else before trial from what she has just
told the jury? In real life, isn’t one important way to tell whether
the person is telling the truth to find out if she said the same
thing before?
Under the Montana Rules of Evidence, these two things—
prior consistent statements and prior inconsistent statements—
are treated very differently from each other, and in some
respects, very differently from the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The purpose of this article is to explore the Montana approach to
prior inconsistent statements. Part II, to be published next issue,
will deal with the treatment of prior consistent statements. (A
discriminating reader has suggested that my previous Evidence
Corner columns may be too long. I agree, and apologize.
Henceforth, I will try to curb my enthusiasm and reserve some of
the “how-to” material for the forthcoming “Montana Evidence
Handbook.”)

Introduction: Prior Statements
and the Hearsay Rule
M.R.E. 802 is the hearsay rule: “Hearsay is not admissible
except as otherwise provided by statute, these rules, or other
rules applicable in the courts of this state.” M.R.E. 801 provides
the definition of “hearsay,” and thus governs what is prohibited
and what is not under Rule 802. The general definition is in
801(c): “Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
All prior statements, consistent and inconsistent, satisfy
the first part of the hearsay definition: they are all necessarily
out-of-court statements. The fact that the person who made
the statements is now a witness in court does not change those
earlier statements into in-court, non-hearsay statements. The
rule against hearsay provides three things: the evidentiary
statement is made under oath, the jury has the chance to
observe the witness while she makes the statement to them,
and cross-examination. The fact that the same person who
spoke out of court earlier is now a witness in court does provide
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cross-examination, but cannot supply either oath or observation
of the earlier statement at the time it was made.
A. If the out-of-court statement is offered to prove
something other than the fact it asserts, such as for
impeachment purposes, it is not hearsay, but then its use is
limited to impeachment.
The second half of M.R.E. 801(c) confines hearsay treatment
to those out-of-court statements which are not being offered
in court to prove the fact that they assert. If the previous outof-court statement is being offered for any other reason, it is
not hearsay and is not barred by 802. The Montana Evidence
Commission Comment to M.R.E. 801 observes:
from the phrase “ ... offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted,” statements offered
for purposes other than to prove the truth of their
contents are not hearsay. …
It is theoretically correct to say that statements
not offered to prove the truth of their contents are
not hearsay because their reliability is not in issue, only whether or not the statement was made.
Hearsay statements are ordinarily not admitted
because their reliability cannot be tested by oath,
cross-examination, and the presence of the trier of
fact, the three ideal conditions under which testimony is given by witnesses. Advisory Committee’s
Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 288 (1972). When a statement
is introduced for purposes other than proving the
truth of its content, the witness testifying as to the
making of the statement by the hearsay declarant is doing so under the three ideal conditions.
Therefore, statements which are offered for purposes other than to prove the truth of their content
are not hearsay under the definition.
Thus, a lawyer can always meet “Objection! Hearsay!” by
responding “This is an out of court statement, Your Honor, but I
am not using it to prove the truth of its content.”
The technical judge should then ask: “Well, what are you
using it for, if not the truth of the content?” You must satisfy
the judge that you have some relevant reason for introducing
the statement, other than to prove that what was said outside
of court is true. One of the primary “purposes other than to
prove the truth of their content” is to show the credibility or
incredibility of the witness on the stand. You are not using the
statement to prove the fact it asserts, but instead to show that the
statement just made in court by the witness is false or true. This
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out-of-court statement (OCS) will support your closing that
“witness X speaketh with forked tongue, so you can’t believe
what she said here in court.” Therefore, you can skate by the
hearsay objection and get the OCS in merely by saying “Your
honor, I am introducing this OCS for impeachment purposes
only.” (M.R.E. 4011 explicitly states that “Relevant evidence may
include evidence bearing upon the credibility of a witness or
hearsay declarant.”)
If the only permissible use of the OCS is impeachment or
rehabilitation of an in-court witness, the fact-finder may not use
the contents of the OCS in deciding the facts of the case. The
only permissible use of the OCS is for the jury to consider it in
deciding if the witness was truthful on the stand. If no other
evidence of the fact asserted in the OCS is introduced, that fact
is not proven. Under M.R.E. 105, the party opposing the OCS
is entitled, upon request, to a limiting instruction on this point.
(Lawyers, judges and commentators are divided on the efficacy
of such an instruction.) If you are able to get an OCS in for a
limited purpose, you must also introduce at least a scintilla (I
call this a chinchilla) of other evidence on which a jury could
find in your favor, or the favorable verdict may be reversed.
For example, imagine a debt collection case brought by an
estate. The defendant’s brother testifies as a witness at trial that
their family has a strict policy of “neither a borrower or a lender
be,” so the defendant never would have borrowed any money
from the decedent. On rebuttal, the plaintiff calls the brother’s
barber, who testifies that the brother told the barber that the
brothers had borrowed money from Joe but would never have to
pay it back because Joe was now dead. If this OCS is allowed in
for impeachment only, the jury cannot use it to find that a loan
occurred. At most, it can find that the brother lied on the stand,
but this is cannot satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of proof.
B. M.R.E. 801(d) magically transposes some out-of-court
statements offered to prove their contents into non-hearsay,
which are not affected by Rule 802, and can be admitted as
substantive evidence.
Rule 801(d)(1) provides, outright, that three kinds of prior
OCS by a person who testifies at trial are simply not hearsay,
even if they are offered for the truth of the facts they assert.
These types of statements are not exceptions to the hearsay rule;
they are not hearsay at all. Therefore, they are not subject to Rule
802 and are admissible to prove the facts they assert. The exact
text of the rule is:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is
(A) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony,
or
1 This phrase does not occur in the federal version of Rule 401, either as originally
written or as amended in 2011, although there are many federal cases indicating
that the credibility of a witness is relevant, at least on non-collateral matters.
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(B) consistent with the declarant’s testimony
and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of subsequent fabrication, improper influence or motive, or
(C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving the person;
The Montana Evidence Commission Comment indicates that
the Commission modeled 801(d) on the F.R.E. but modified two
of the three federal subdivisions (which I will discuss in more
detail below) for use in Montana:
The effect of this rule is to place certain statements “ ... which would otherwise literally fall
within ... ” the hearsay definition outside the hearsay rule.
Subdivision (d)(1) deals with certain prior
statements of the witness who is now testifying
and subject to ideal conditions of oath, crossexamination, and presence of the trier of fact. The
Commission feels that the application of the conditions at the trial or hearing is sufficient to take
these statements out of the hearsay rule, for requiring their application at the time the statement was
made would have the effect of excluding almost
all prior statements. Therefore, these prior statements are admitted as substantive evidence. It
should also be noted that the subdivision limits the
types of prior statements placed outside the hearsay rule to three: This is a compromise between
allowing “general use of prior prepared statements
as substantive evidence” which could lead to an
abuse of preferring prepared statements to actual
testimony, and allowing no prior statements to be
admitted, which is not sensible, for “ ... particular circumstances call for a contrary result. The
judgment is one more for experience than logic”.
Advisory Committee’s Note, supra 56 F.R.D. at 295.
(Emphasis added).
1. Under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A), all prior inconsistent
statements are now admissible as substantive evidence to prove
the facts they assert.
If the witness testifies at trial, anything else she said on the
same subject before trial which contradicts her testimony is
admissible not just for impeachment of her in-court testimony,
but to prove the fact that she stated earlier, out of court. The
Commission noted that the existing Montana law on the use
of prior inconsistent statements was quite confusing (see
below) and that “the apparent practice in Montana is to give a
cautionary instruction that prior inconsistent statements may be
used only for impeachment purposes. Therefore, this clause has
the effect of clarifying as well as changing existing Montana
law.” The Commission cited two other rationales for this new
treatment of prior inconsistent statements: that juries might
not follow the standard cautionary instruction, and that “this
STATEMENTS, next page
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testifies that the light was green, and somewhere else told
someone that the light was red, there is a clear inconsistency
and the earlier statement is admissible. Further, the Montana
Supreme Court has held that even a minor inconsistency suffices
statement is always made closer in time to the event, free from
any influences, and therefore has an assurance of trustworthiness under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). In State v. Herman, the defendant was
accused of stabbing a man with whom the defendant and his
like many hearsay exceptions.”
father had had a bar fight. The night of the stabbing, the police
In an attorney disbarment proceeding decided just after
interviewed the defendant’s father on video (which the police
the adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence, the defending
lost, held to be harmless) and the father also wrote out a half
attorney objected to admission of prior inconsistent statements
page statement. “¶ 37 In his testimony at trial, Herman’s father
to prove the facts they asserted. The Montana Supreme Court
said he chatted with the bartender for a minute or two before
agreed that at least prior to a 1941 case, State v. Jolly, 112 Mont.
352, 116 P.2d 686, “previous inconsistent statements of a witness going outside. In his written statement, he said he followed
Herman outside. Thus, there is inconsistency between his
were admissible for impeachment purposes only and did not
testimony and his statement, even though it is minor. The
constitute substantive evidence,” and that in the period of
District Court’s admission of the statement into evidence was in
time after Jolly but before the M.R.E. were adopted, the law of
accordance with M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1), which provides a prior
Montana on the admission of prior inconsistent statements for
oral or written statement inconsistent with the testimony of a
substantive rather than impeachment purposes was “in flux.”
trial witness is admissible.” State v. Herman, 350 Mont. 109, 117,
Matter of Goldman, 179 Mont. 526, 549, 588 P.2d 964, 977
204 P.3d 1254, 1260 (2009). (Again, this case earlier describes
(1978). The Court went on to observe that:
the use of the prior inconsistent statement as for “impeachment”
With this background, the Commission on
but this restriction is unnecessary because the rule defines the
Rules of Evidence in proposing the new Rules of
prior inconsistent statement as non-hearsay, thus usable for
Evidence for this Court felt prior inconsistent statesubstantive purposes).
ments were admissible as substantive evidence, and
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) also applies where the witness said
suggested for adoption, Rule 801(d)(1) (A), accordsomething on the subject outside of court and now testifies that
ingly. This Court had approved those rules prior to
she does not remember anything about that subject, and/or that
the hearing hereunder, even though the effective
she does not remember giving an earlier statement.
date would not begin until July 1, 1977.
Montana law used to be a mess, to say the least, on the
The foregoing cases would indicate the law in
issue of whether memory lapse is a form of “inconsistency” so
Montana on this point was in flux, but the Court
as to invoke 801(d)(1)(A). When the Commission forwarded
was moving toward a change in the rule of Wise
its version of the M.R.E. to the Supreme Court, its Comment
v. Stagg, supra. The matter is now settled with the
to 801(d)(1)(A) included this language: “It is the intent of the
adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence. Such
Commission that a witness’ failure to recollect at a trial or
testimony is now clearly admissible for substanhearing is an inconsistency under 801(d)(1)(A) when a witness
tive purposes. (Emphasis added)
has made a prior statement on the matter under inquiry.”
Matter of Goldman, 179 Mont. at 550, 588 P.2d at 977 (1978). Despite this clear language in the Comment, after the M.R.E.
were adopted, two different lines of decisions developed, one
holding that a failure of memory is an inconsistent statement,
The Montana prior inconsistent statement rule is much
and the other the opposite. The Court acknowledged and
more inclusive than the federal version of 801(d)(1)(A). The
resolved this discrepancy in State v. Lawrence, 285 Mont. 140,
federal rules allow use of only those prior statements which are
159, 948 P. 2nd 186, 198 (1997):
inconsistent with the declarant/witness’s trial testimony AND
which were made “given under penalty of perjury at a trial,
“Given the weight of authority, we believe
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition.” In Montana,
Devlin is the better reasoned opinion, and hold
any prior inconsistent statement, made anywhere, anytime,
that a claimed lapse of memory is an inconsistency
is usable. This means that a Montanan who spills her guts at
within the meaning of Rule 801(d)(1)(A). To
the Stockmen’s (Stockpersons’?) Bar and later tells a Montana
the extent that our prior decision in Goodwin is
state jury something quite different can expect to see the
inconsistent with this holding, it is overruled.”
bartender take (I originally wrote “mount” but the visual was
(Emphasis supplied).
bad) the stand. If the same case were tried in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Montana, her drunken rambling
In the Lawrence case, the witness Mary was diagnosed with
would be inadmissible except for its impeachment value. The
dementia, possibly Alzheimer’s. Prior to trial, she had given 5
Montana Commission explained its decision to broaden the
statements to the police. At trial, she frequently said she couldn’t
prior inconsistent statement rule: “The clause deletes the oath
remember certain facts, and also that she couldn’t remember
requirement as unnecessary and harmful to the usefulness of the
having given prior statements about them. The Court held that
rule. The Commission believes that prior inconsistent statements
this testimony was inconsistent with her prior statements, and
should be admissible as substantive evidence.”
affirmed the judge’s admission of them under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)
The only requirement to admit a prior inconsistent statement
is that the declarant must have testified at trial, and the prior
STATEMENTS, next page
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(A). (This case is also very useful for reviewing HOW to admit
prior inconsistent statements).
In State v. Howard, 362 Mont. 196, 204, 265 P.3d 606, 613
(2011), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Lawrence: “In that
case, we also stated a claimed lapse of memory constitutes an
inconsistent statement for the purposes of M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)
(A). Lawrence, 285 Mont. at 159, 948 P.2d at 198. We did not,
however, hold claimed memory lapse was the only ground for
application of Rule 80 1(d)(1)(A).” In Howard, the child victim/
witness on the stand in a sexual abuse case recanted several previous statements and said she didn’t remember others; the court
allowed a DVD of the child’s pretrial interviews into evidence.
Both trial court decisions were affirmed on appeal.
Thus, prior inconsistent statements are clearly admissible
in Montana state court trials. Once the witness has testified
on the stand, anything else she has said on the same subject,
anywhere, any time, to anyone, which outright contradicts her
trial testimony, or serves to fill a memory lapse on the stand, is
admissible, not just for impeachment but also to prove the fact
she earlier asserted.
Coming next month: Part II, Prior Consistent Statements in
Montana

----------------Editor’s note and correction: The February edition of this
series, “A refresher: Montana evidence law sources and research,”
containted an incorrect reference referring to the “parol evidence
rule” on page 41. The correct reference is as follows:
28-2-905. When extrinsic evidence concerning a written
agreement may be considered. (1) Whenever the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing by the parties, it is to
be considered as containing all those terms. Therefore, there can
be between the parties and their representatives or successors in
interest no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing except in the following cases:
(a) when a mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in
issue by the pleadings;
(b) when the validity of the agreement is the fact in
dispute.
(2) This section does not exclude other evidence of the
circumstances under which the agreement was made or to which
it relates, as described in 1-4-102, or other evidence to explain an
extrinsic ambiguity or to establish illegality or fraud.
(3) The term “agreement”, for the purposes of this section,
includes deeds and wills as well as contracts between parties.
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